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 ABSTRACT 
 
We critiqued  the PSE method as it is traditionally applied. It can be concluded that it has severe 
limitations when it is applied to Russian agriculture during transition to a market economy. Many of the 
conditions and assumptions taken for granted in mature market economies cannot be assumed for 
transition economies, so the validity of PSE measures is questionable. The specific approaches are applied 
 to calculate PSEs for Russian agriculture, emphasizing the  unique structure of production and marketing 
channels. The appropriate interpretations of PSE estimations for major agricultural commodities are 
provided. 
 
  
 
 
 
 PRODUCER SUBSIDY EQUIVALENTS AND EVALUATION OF SUPPORT 
 TO RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS 
 
 Introduction 
The analysis of agricultural policy often includes the estimation of overall effects on the 
performance of domestic agriculture. The best known and internationally adopted method to appraise the 
effect of all policy instruments is the  producer subsidy equivalent (PSE). Recently this kind of analysis 
has been carried out for Russian agriculture (Liefert, et al). The general conclusion was that Athe 
estimated values are highly negative, indicating that Russian agriculture has been heavily taxed.@  The 
authors state that this result derives from the  following factors:  AFirst, government trade and price 
policies, at the regional as well as federal level, have operated to keep domestic producer prices below 
world prices.  Second, deficient Russian physical and institutional infrastructure has resulted in high 
domestic transaction costs for Russian agricultural output. Since in competing with goods on the world 
market, Russian producers must  bear all the costs of getting their output to final users, the high 
transaction costs in an economic sense also tax domestic production.@  The final results of this analysis are 
presented in  Table 1. 
However, the conclusion and supporting arguments, together with the chosen data for these 
calculations, raise some doubts and concerns about the consistency of approaches to this analysis. In order 
to make these concerns clear we need to analyze in more detail both the principles  of  the PSE approach 
and the specific features of the agricultural structure and markets in Russia. 
 
 The Concept of PSE 
The PSE method  was initially developed by Professor Tim Josling for the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the UN (FAO) in the early 1970s (Cahil and Legg). It was adopted by the Organization 
For Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in implementing the 1982 Ministerial Trade 
Mandate.  PSEs were initially  calculated for a set of OECD countries consisting of Austria, Australia, 
Canada, the European Economic Commonwealth (EEC), Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. The 
purpose of  calculating PSEs  was to provide in a single, all-inclusive measure,  the transfers to the 
agricultural sector from the rest of the economy arising from government policies.  
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For each product, the PSE for a given category of support represents the value to agricultural 
producers of the transfers from consumers or the government due to the support at the existing level of  
production.  PSEs are calculated at the farmgate level. The prices received by farmers  are the prices paid 
by consumers at the first level of consumption.  Under these conditions, the consumption price at the 
farmgate is the producer price, except when the level of consumption is higher than the level of 
production and the level of market support of the quantities imported is different from that of domestic 
production. 
 
Table 1. Estimates of PSEs for Russian agriculture (percentage per unit value) 
 
 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
Beef  
 
-1162 
 
-449 
 
-363 
 
Pork 
 
-680 
 
-175 
 
-136 
 
Poultry 
 
-432 
 
-58 
 
-31 
 
Milk 
 
-918 
 
-467 
 
-310 
 
Eggs 
 
-635 
 
-209 
 
-79 
 
Wheat 
 
-399 
 
-292 
 
-341 
 
Corn 
 
-120 
 
-103 
 
-24 
 
Barley 
 
-277 
 
-187 
 
-304 
 
Sugar beets 
 
-482 
 
-184 
 
-108 
 
Sunflower seeds 
 
-164 
 
-322 
 
-173 
Source: derived from Liefert et al. 
 
The PSE is an indicator of the value of the transfers from domestic consumers and taxpayers to 
producers resulting from a given set of agricultural policies at a point in time. Thus,  PSEs are aggregate 
measures of the total monetary value of the assistance to output and inputs on a commodity-by-
commodity basis, associated with government policies. 
Four categories of agricultural policy measures are included in the OECD calculations of PSEs: 
(1) Measures that simultaneously affect producer and consumer prices (market price support); 
(2) Measures that transfer money directly to producers without raising prices to consumers (direct 
payment); 
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(3) Measures that lower input costs (reduction in input costs); 
(4) Measures that in the long term reduce costs but that are not directly received by producers 
(general services). 
PSEs can be expressed in three ways: (1) as the total value of transfers for the commodity 
produced; (2) as the total value of transfers per unit of the commodity produced; and (3) as the total value 
of transfers as a percentage of the total value of production including transfers. 
In algebraic form, where the level of production is Qp, the domestic market price is Pd, the world 
price is Pw, direct payments are D, levies on producers are L and all other budgetary financed support is 
B, the PSE expressions as measured by OECD are (Cahil and Legg, 16): 
 
Total PSE =  Qp(Pd - Pw)  + D - L + B 
Unit PSE = Total PSE/Qp  
Percentage PSE = 100 (Total PSE)/ [Qp Pd + D - L] (at domestic prices). 
 
There are some underlying assumptions for the calculation of PSEs: 
(1) Markets of agricultural commodities have downward-sloping demand and upward-sloping 
supply curves which determine equilibrium prices and producer and consumer surpluses; it 
means the Alaw of one price@ should be applied; 
(2) An open small-country economy is assumed, where prices in the world market are assumed to 
express the opportunity costs to domestic producers and consumers; 
(3) Commodities are assumed to be homogeneous for producers and consumers. This applies both 
to the commodities defined for reference (world) price purposes and domestic commodities. 
We will show that, if the main purpose of the calculation of PSEs is taken into consideration, the 
methods  used by the above-mentioned paper are not consistent with the purpose, because some of the 
assumptions are violated.  It will also be shown  that more accuracy is required when one operates with 
statistical data on Russian agricultural production and sales.  The improved data approach will give 
significantly different results even in the framework of standard methodology. 
 
 Discussion of the Assumptions for PSE Calculations  
It is necessary to mention that originally the PSEs method was applied for the countries with 
developed market economies. All of them are well integrated  into the  world agricultural and 
nonagricultural markets.  That is why the use of this methodology for countries with  economies in 
transition to market economy and with a low  level of integration in international markets could be limited 
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(Harley, Meyers).  For each country  different limitations may apply. Further, we consider some 
restrictions which make the use of the PSE method for Russian agriculture questionable. 
The Alaw of one price@ is not applicable in most transition economies, though the degree of market 
integration varies considerably. It is particularly not acceptable for Russian agriculture due to a few main 
reasons. 
 
First Assumption 
First, Russian agricultural producers vary greatly in the degree of market integration.  At present, 
there are three forms of  agricultural enterprises in Russia.  One group consists of 25,000 large 
agricultural enterprises, LAEs, (average area is 5000 ha, average labor force is 500 employees).  In 1994, 
they  produced about 60 percent  of agricultural output. Approximately 38 percent of output is produced 
by  private subsidiary farms, PSFs, consisting of a few million small land plots (average size is 0.4 ha).  
About 2 percent of output is produced by newly emerged private farms (peasant farms) which have an 
average area of 40 ha and a labor force of 3 persons. During the transition period, one can observe 
significant changes in the structure of agricultural production (see Tables 2 and 3).  Each of these groups 
has its own specific production and marketing characteristics and faces very different input and product 
market conditions, but Liefert et al. analyze the whole agricultural sector without distinguishing the 
difference between various groups of producers. 
  
Table 2.  Share of  agricultural output among groups (percent of total output) 
 
 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
Large agricultural enterprises 
 
76 
 
72 
 
66 
 
63 
 
60 
 
Private subsidiary farms 
 
24 
 
28 
 
33 
 
35 
 
38 
 
Peasant farms 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
Source: Russian Statistical  Yearbook, 1995. p. 351 
 
Because these sectors have different structures of sales channels they face different prices. For 
example, most meat produced by large agricultural enterprises is sold to local meat processors.  Private 
subsidiary farms prefer to sell their products on local public retail markets (bazaars).  That is why in one 
case the agricultural producers receive the procurement (wholesale) price and in the other case they 
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receive retail price and internalize the processing and markets costs.  By virtue of the fact that both 
channels of sales have significant shares of the meat market, we cannot consider only one price as a 
representative farm price for the domestic meat market. Liefert et al. applied only the wholesale price for 
all agricultural commodities.  This approach could substantially understate the revenue for agricultural 
producers depending on the type of commodity.  The structure of sales for each agricultural commodity 
varies.  For example, the bulk of grain is sold on the wholesale market to processor or other enterprises. 
At the same time, most potatoes are marketed to consumers through local retail markets.  Taking into 
consideration all these reasons, a researcher needs to distinguish groups of producers and different 
commodity markets in order to obtain the correct information about prices and revenues in agriculture to 
be used in PSE calculations. 
 
Table 3. The production shares among the groups of agricultural producers in 1993, in percent 
 
 
 
Large agricultural 
enterprises 
 
Private subsidiary 
farms 
 
 
Peasant farms 
 
All grains 
 
94.2 
 
0.6 
 
5.2 
 
Potatoes 
 
16.5 
 
82.5 
 
1.0 
 
Vegetables 
 
34.5 
 
64.5 
 
1.0 
 
Meat 
 
59.4 
 
39.5 
 
1.1 
 
Milk 
 
64.2 
 
34.7 
 
1.1 
 
Eggs 
 
73.0 
 
27.0 
 
0.0 
Source:  Russian Statistical  Yearbook, 1994. p.353, 365. 
 
Second Assumption 
Russian agriculture does not operate in the framework of an open country economy for all 
agricultural commodities.  There are only a few cases when one can apply this approach:  sugar, butter, 
poultry, and vegetable oil.  A Russian agricultural producer works under the condition of nearly closed or 
isolated markets for most other commodities.  It means that only domestically (sometimes locally) 
originated demand and supply clear the market.  The prices on the world agricultural markets do not 
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significantly affect domestic prices, so they cannot represent the opportunity cost for the agricultural 
producers.  
There are several reasons that may explain this situation. The first one is a difference in the quality 
of commodities.  Most agricultural producers and food processors cannot provide the quality of products 
required for international markets.  The second reason is the lack of knowledge of international markets. 
And the third factor is an insufficient market infrastructure to transfer signals from world markets to  
domestic producers.  Also, the experience of many Russian businessmen shows that federal or local 
regulations cannot be considered as significant obstacles to the export of food products from Russia. 
However, the necessity to meet the quality  requirements in other countries is a real challenge.  As a 
result, the export of agricultural and food products occupies an insignificant share in the market and 
cannot be considered at present as a source of revenue for domestic agriculture. 
The main part of agricultural output can be sold only on domestic markets and in most cases only 
on local or regional markets.  Therefore, one should be very careful in determining a reference price that 
may represent the opportunity cost for domestic producers.  In very rare cases it could be the world prices 
(for example, in recent years a small amount of barley, wheat, and flour were traded in other countries). 
However, the small volume of this trade indicates that these markets are not available to most producers. 
Therefore, these prices cannot be considered as the opportunity cost for the whole of agriculture.  In some 
cases (for example, grains) the average national prices can represent the opportunity costs for many 
agricultural producers.  However, for some agricultural products only local or regional prices are realistic 
market information for agricultural producers.  Only the level of these prices determines a producer's 
revenue for a particular commodity.  The bulk of agricultural products fall into that category, including 
meat, milk, eggs, and potatoes. 
The use of import prices as the reference prices can also be appropriate in some cases.  The 
discussion of this approach follows below, because it is connected with the violation of the assumption of 
homogeneity of commodities. 
 
Third Assumption 
The violation of the third assumption can be considered in the framework of arguments that were 
applied to explain the violation of the second assumption.  Liefert et al. used some world prices as the 
reference prices for domestic production.  However, they do not explain how they provide for the 
compatibility of these prices with prices for domestically produced agricultural commodities. 
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In some cases the authors used the prices for one kind of commodity as a reference price for another 
one.  For example, for wheat they used the price that represents food wheat with high quality 
characteristics (protein, milling quality, etc.).  At the same time, the chosen domestic price is the average 
wheat price including food and feed varieties.  In the case of poultry, the reference price relates mostly to 
imported chicken legs.  However, the domestic price relates to the whole chicken carcass.  Therefore, the 
assumption of homogeneity of commodities is violated.  
Further, there are some concerns about the use of so-called Aworld prices@ for such kinds of 
agricultural commodities as sugarbeets, milk, and eggs.  These commodities are raw agricultural products 
that are not traded internationally.  If the authors used prices from other countries, it means that they 
violated the second assumption because these markets are not available for Russian agricultural 
producers. 
 
The Exchange Rate  
The previous arguments have cast some doubt on the acceptability of the PSE methodology to 
estimate the overall transfer to or from agricultural producers.  However, it is also necessary to mention 
the problems connected with the choice of exchange rate in these calculations.  
The exchange rate is the price of one currency in terms of another one.  In our case, this price 
reflects the equilibrium on the money market which is comprised of dollar demand and supply and ruble 
demand and supply.  Until 1994, the ruble exchange rate was far from equilibrium with supply and 
demand forces, as it adjusted from a complete controlled rate to a relatively flexible rate.  That is why the 
use of a commercial ruble/dollar exchange rate for the estimation of transfer to Russian agricultural 
producers prior to 1994 is not realistic.  Liefert et al. even showed that the use of another exchange rate 
(purchasing power parity) would give absolutely the opposite result:  PSEs become positive, and the 
reason for the conclusion, that Russian agriculture is heavily taxed, disappeared immediately.  However, 
the authors did not attempt to use a calculated equilibrium exchange rate, as is normally done in OECD 
studies.  Our analysis later in this paper will test the sensitivity of the results to such an exchange rate 
adjustment. 
 
The Reference Prices 
The correct definition of the external reference prices has always been the most controversial issue 
in the PSE calculation.  Experience has shown that reference prices are the most important parameter in 
determining the magnitude and the trends in PSE.  Liefert et al. have used a practical rule, established by 
OECD, that an f.o.b. (free-on-board) border price would be chosen if a country was a net exporter while a 
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c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) price would be chosen for a net importer (Cahil and Legg, 24).  Moreover, 
the authors have applied this rule for all commodities assuming  that Athe appropriate border prices to use 
in computing PSEs are import c.i.f. prices (mainly to Baltic ports).@ 
Two things can be argued in this approach.  First, to use a uniform approach to calculate PSEs for 
all chosen commodities may not be correct.  In recent OECD studies on agricultural policies in transition 
economies, different prices have been used as a proxy of reference prices.  For example, in order to 
calculate PSEs for the Czech Republic the following reference prices have been used (Review. Czech 
Republic, 281): 
 
- EU export price for wheat (f.o.b. Rouen), barley (f.o.b. French ports), and refined sugar (f.o.b. 
EU),  
- Austrian unit export value for rye, 
- Czech unit export value for potatoes,  
- EU import price for rapeseed,  
- New Zealand farmgate price for milk,  
- EU live animal price for beef, veal, and pigmeat,  
- Extra-EU unit export value for poultry and eggs. 
Secondly, the estimation of some border prices that were used in PSE calculations causes some 
concerns.  For example, Liefert et al. used the reference price for wheat that ranges from $209 to $214 per 
ton for various years.  However, these prices greatly overstate the actual prices of wheat imports to 
Russia.  In 1992 and 1993, the average price of imported wheat was about $146.  Sometimes the price has 
been even lower, because either Russia imported subsidized grain from developed countries or the grain 
was imported from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.  For example, in the first 
quarter of 1995 the average price of imported wheat was $85 per ton, in the second quarter it was $109.  
Also, the quality characteristics of the commodity should be taken into consideration.  The wheat traded 
on the Chicago Board of Trade has, in most cases, different quality characteristics than the bulk of wheat 
traded domestically in Russia.  That is why the so-called Aworld price@ cannot always  serve as a correct 
reference price for PSE calculations. 
 
 Discussion of the Domestic Economic Environment and Regulation 
Liefert et al. suggest that there are two main reasons for Alarge negative PSE calculations@: state 
controls on prices and trade, and deficient agricultural infrastructure.  These factors cause the low 
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farmgate prices, from their point of view.  The discussion in the previous section showed that we cannot 
always consider the world prices as the opportunity costs for domestic agricultural producers.  Now we 
examine how the economic environment and regulations influence domestic agricultural prices. 
State Control on Prices and Trade 
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As Liefert et al. noted, there is no  restriction on internal trade from the federal government.  Also, 
one can analyze the federal regulation for a few recent years and conclude that the federal government did 
not have, does not have, and will not have any intention to restrict the domestic agricultural trade.  There 
are some interventions for international trade.  The federal government imposes significant tariffs on 
imported food (from 15 to 30 percent) which are in favor of the domestic agricultural producers.  In 
addition, the federal government has several programs which significantly increase incentive prices, to 
support revenue for agricultural producers.  That is why the federal agricultural policy cannot be 
considered as a main factor in depressing farmgate prices. 
Further, Liefert et al. suggest that state control, in the form of quotas, licenses, taxes, and bans on 
export, have been stronger at the regional than the federal level.  While this is true, the effects of these 
local policies can be argued.  Based upon economic theory one can conclude that the restrictions on 
export in producing regions cause oversupply in these regions and shortages in net-importing areas.  The 
oversupply causes the prices to fall in producing regions, and, at the same time, the shortage will cause 
the increase of the prices in deficit  regions.  Sooner or later the agricultural products will be moved from 
exporting regions to importing regions.  Since arbitrage cannot be presented, both effects of the regional 
export restrictions need to be recognized, as well as the possibility of arbitrage to exploit the price 
differences that result from these restrictions. 
Another argument that supports the existence of state control on the local level is  the controlling of 
retail prices for food commodities.  A reference from a Russian source quoted by Liefert et al. states that 
in March 1994  the percentage of cities that control retail prices at a low level is 66 for bread, 35 for 
sugar, 33 for meat, and 44 for milk.  The authors assume that these restrictions cause the lower level of 
purchasing prices for agricultural producers.  
However, the percentage of cities that control retail prices together with the facts of trade 
restrictions  do not provide sufficient information about the significance of control on the deviation of 
prices from equilibrium.  The authors assumed that the implementation of these regulations at the local 
level can be a significant factor that explains the large difference (from 2 to 10 times) between the world 
prices and the domestic prices on agricultural products.  In order to obtain this kind of conclusion detailed 
studies should be conducted. 
  Unfortunately, we are not aware of studies on this matter.  However, we can cite another study on  
retail food prices in Russia, conducted by Gardener and Brooks, that shows that regulation on the local 
level explains only a small part of price differences between cities of Russia.  That is why we cannot use 
this factor to explain the significant deviation of the domestic prices from the world prices.  
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Alternative Evaluation of PSEs 
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned arguments, another calculation of PSEs for Russian 
agriculture has been conducted.  The results of these calculations and the discussion on this matter is 
presented in this part of the paper.  In Table 4 one can find the final result of these calculations.  The 
tables with calculations of PSEs are provided in Appendix 1. 
Several modifications have been made to compare with the previous work.  First, production 
marketed has been separated between different groups of agricultural producers.  Second, the appropriate 
prices  have been applied for each part of production marketed.  Wholesale prices have been used for the 
output marketed by large agricultural producers.  Retail prices from city markets have been chosen as a 
proxy for the products marketed by private subsidiary farms.  Third, different approaches have been 
applied to chose reference prices depending upon the commodity and the situation on the market.  
From these calculations two periods can be distinguished:  the period with negative PSEs and the 
period with positive PSEs. We can interpret the negative estimates of market price support to mean that 
agricultural producers supply cheaper agricultural products than could be imported from the international 
market.  This situation is beneficial for domestic consumers.  One cannot interpret the situation as a 
transfer from agricultural producers to consumers or taxation of agriculture.  Both sides of the food 
market prefer to operate under these conditions because open markets with current exchange rates would 
mean extremely high prices, decrease of consumption for consumers, and the loss of significant markets 
for agricultural producers. 
Also, agricultural producers cannot compete on the international market due to the difference in 
quality between domestically produced and internationally traded products.  Also, there are no developed 
channels for international trade.  The small volume of agricultural exports indicates that only an 
insignificant portion of agricultural producers can receive benefits from international trade, taking 
advantage of substantially lower costs of production. 
It could be taken into consideration that the commercial exchange rate for 1992 cannot be used in 
the conventional way as in other countries.  The exchange market was very Athin,@ with a small volume of 
exchanged currency, and unstable due to the high level of inflation and changes in governmental 
regulation.  At that period, the level and dynamic of exchange rate did not fully reflect the domestic 
economic conditions.  Like any market, the currency market needed some time for adaptation to the new 
economic environment.  Before that period, the exchange rate was established only by government.  
Later,  a greater volume of currency became involved in exchanges, and imported food products became 
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an important part of overall import.  At that period (presumably 1993-1994), the exchange rate started to 
play a more significant role for food consumption and agricultural producers.  One can see that market 
price support became positive at the 1993-94 period for most of the analyzed products.  
 
Table 4. Alternative estimates of PSEs for Russian agriculture  
(percentage per unit value) 
 
 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
Beef and veal 
 
-148 
 
-16 
 
14 
 
Pigmeat 
 
-33 
 
22 
 
42 
 
Poultry 
 
-32 
 
21 
 
38 
 
Milk 
 
-4 
 
3 
 
45 
 
Eggs 
 
-211 
 
30 
 
48 
 
Wheat 
 
-106 
 
-98 
 
-132 
 
Corn 
 
-40 
 
-48 
 
-10 
 
Barley 
 
-274 
 
-88 
 
-90 
 
Sugar beets 
 
16 
 
25 
 
16 
 
Sunflower seeds 
 
-56 
 
0 
 
5 
 
Potatoes 
 
-103 
 
-68 
 
64 
Source:  author=s calculations 
 
We assume that the positive value of market price support for agricultural producers has three 
sources: budget transfers, consumer transfers, and compensation for entrepreneurship.  The compensation 
for entrepreneurship is not an independent or additional source of money flow for the agricultural 
producer.  Part of consumer transfers goes to agricultural producers directly because they sell a part of 
their output on retail markets.  Of course, agricultural producers bear some expenditures connected with 
processing and transporting commodities to consumers.  In the case of meat products, it means they need 
to slaughter livestock and cut carcasses.  Some part of milk is also sold in the form of processed products 
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(sour cream, butter, and cheese).  Experience shows that these expenditures are significantly lower than 
the gap between farmgate and retail prices. 
In the previous analysis, it has been pointed out that retail prices were applied only for sales by 
private subsidiary farms.  However, it is a well known fact that large agricultural producers also use this 
channel to receive Alive cash.@  Usually they do not report correctly the volume of these sales. 
In other words, positive market support can be interpreted as a support of entrepreneurship by 
agricultural producers.  
 
 Analysis of PSEs by Commodity 
Meats 
The market price for beef for large agricultural producers can be found in the annual official 
statistical handbook.  One can also find the annual average price through other channels.  It is important 
to note that these sources indicate that almost 80 percent of beef sales go through the wholesale market 
(local meat processors and consumer cooperatives).  Thus, procurement prices serve as good indicators of 
market revenue for large agricultural producers. 
The determination of the market price for private subsidiary farms is a complex task.  There is no 
official statistical information about these sales.  For this reason, city market prices are used as a proxy of 
the market price for these agricultural producers, because most products from PSFs go to consumers 
through local retail markets.  The officially reported volume of agricultural products sold by private 
subsidiary farms is  underestimated (perhaps significantly).  For obvious reasons, private farmers do not 
prefer to report a true volume of sales.  Therefore, the overall revenue for the agricultural sector from 
private subsidiary farms is consistently understated.  However, our calculations show that even using the 
official information on these agricultural producers significantly changes the financial performance of the 
agricultural sector. 
Because Russia imports a significant quantity of beef (1992 - 288,000 tons, 1994-358,000 tons),  
one can use the average price of imported red meat as a reference price for beef.  The justification for this 
approach is that the import of beef is the real opportunity cost for Russian meat processors and meat 
traders. 
The supported domestic price is the sum of the weighted market price plus per unit policy transfer 
(all weighted subsidies).  This approach has been applied because rural families, who own most of the 
private subsidiary farms, work simultaneously on large agricultural enterprises.  The subsidies are partly 
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absorbed  by these rural families in the form of salaries and resources on preferential prices (e.g., feed, 
machinery rent, and fuel). 
For poultry, as for other meats, the annual average prices of imports are used as reference prices. 
Objections may be made that the poultry import consists of chicken legs, while the weighted market price 
reflects the whole carcass price.  However, imported poultry can be considered as a perfect substitute for 
other poultry meat.  Moreover, Russian consumers prefer legs to other chicken parts.  As a result, in a 
situation of equal prices, consumers will choose legs rather a whole chicken.  In addition, the general 
quality of domestically produced poultry is lower than that of the imported poultry. 
The PSEs for beef were the lowest among livestock products (Appendix, Table A.1).  While the 
cattle sector has the same level of subsidies in revenue as the hog sector, the share of production sold on 
retail markets is lower.  The relatively high PSE estimates for pigmeat can be explained by both the 
significant share of the production marketed by private subsidiary farms and by the level of subsidies 
(Appendix, Table A.2).  The same reasons hold true for the poultry sector.  However, in 1994 the level of 
retail prices was probably affected by an import tariff.  Thus, some transfers to poultry producers can be 
connected with this factor (Appendix, Table A.3).  It is expected that the PSE for 1995 will be 
significantly higher for this sector because import tariffs have been increased. 
 
Milk 
For milk the standard OECD procedure is used to calculate PSE (Appendix, Table A.5).  The New 
Zealand farmgate price for milk serves as a reference price.  This is a reasonable reference price for 
Russia, since much imported butter is from New Zealand.  The estimate of transportation cost is taken 
from Review of Agricultural Policy: Estonia. Working Party Paper. Annex 1. 
The percentage PSE for milk was negative in 1992, and  reached the lowest level in absolute value 
among livestock products.  In 1994, PSE for milk reached the highest positive value for two reasons.  
First, milk production in large agricultural enterprises was heavily subsidized by local governments 
because it was the main resource of milk for the urban population.  The share of subsidies in revenue from 
marketed milk was the highest among livestock products: 36 percent in 1992, 25 percent in 1993 , and 28 
percent in 1994.   Second, both private subsidiary farms and large agricultural enterprises sold a 
significant amount of milk on retail markets.  Thus the high level of positive PSE can be attributed in part 
to entrepreneurship. 
 
Grains 
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Average prices of imported wheat, barley, and corn are used as a proxy for a reference price for 
grains.  These prices include transportation cost to Russian continental ports, and can be considered as an 
opportunity cost for domestic grain trade companies and mills.  There is no significant difference in 
transportation costs within the country between imported grain and domestically produced grain.  On 
average, the transportation and handling cost of grain from sea ports to consuming areas is almost the 
same as the transportation and handling cost from domestic agricultural regions to the consuming areas. 
The difference in the quality of imported grain and domestically traded grain should be taken into 
account.  This problem is a reality for wheat, especially.  Russia used to import high quality food wheat 
(hard and durum varieties with higher protein content and other superior quality characteristics).  
Reported  marketed wheat production in Russia includes both food and feed varieties.  Therefore, the 
average quality of  domestically marketed wheat is lower than imported wheat.  Also, Russia exports 
mainly feed grains (wheat and barley). 
The negative PSEs for wheat reflect a specific situation in the food market (Appendix, Table A.6). 
Grain products are the main components of human consumption in Russia, and now they are even more 
important than before.  The consumption of grain products has increased significantly.  This conclusion 
cannot be extracted from official data on consumption.  These data show that there is a slight increase in 
the consumption of grain products.  However, before price liberalization a substantial portion of grain 
products went to feed livestock on private subsidiary farms because of a very low price and ample 
availability of bread products compared with the high price and poor delivery system for concentrated 
feed. 
After price liberalization, market prices corrected this situation.  Since that time, human 
consumption has not included feed for livestock.  Therefore, in reality, many more grain products are 
consumed directly and they play a significant role in daily diets.  For this reason, federal and local 
governments consider a stable supply of grain products as a primary goal for food market policy. 
Generally, with the exemption of a few regions, they allow markets to clear prices.  However, they use 
imports (from abroad and from other regions) to provide enough supply to keep grain product 
consumption at a stable level.  This additional supply keeps retail prices at a stable level, lower than they 
would be otherwise.  
Can this situation be viewed as some kind of taxation for agricultural producers, and would 
agricultural producers obtain A air@ prices in the absence of this policy?  In general, the answer to these 
questions is Ano.@  In the short run and even in the long run, agricultural producers are not able to provide 
an adequate quantity of grain to match the goals of state social  policy.  Also, the average quality of 
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domestically produced food wheat is lower than that available on international markets.  In situations of 
unrestricted competition, domestic mills prefer to import wheat.  In the extreme case, imported wheat can 
substitute for a substantial part of domestically produced wheat.  As a result, agricultural producers will 
lose a huge share of the market and their total revenue could be even lower compared with current 
conditions.  Another result will be increases in retail prices and decreased  consumption, which could 
provoke serious social conflicts.  The government would be forced to subsidize imports to support 
socially acceptable prices.  Due to the decrease of the domestic producers' surplus and the increase of 
government spending, the overall losses for society could be much higher compared with the current 
situation. 
  The negative PSEs for corn (Appendix, Table A.7) and barley (Appendix, Table A.8) are caused  
by the fact that they are used mainly to feed livestock.  This sector has negative PSE estimates and the 
demand for feed crops is the derived demand from the livestock sector. 
Sugar Beets/Sugar 
The price of imported raw sugar is used as a reference price for sugar beets.  This price reflects the 
opportunity cost for Russian sugar refiners.  They always have a choice to produce white sugar from 
sugar beets or from imported raw sugar. 
This calculation also takes into account that since 1992, agricultural producers have preferred to 
order refiners to process sugar beets.  After that, agricultural enterprises sell or barter refined sugar on 
their own.  Positive PSEs for sugar beets are explained partly by subsidies and partly by the benefit of 
entrepreneurship (Appendix, Table A.10).  Also, the level of domestic prices has been increasing due to 
the introduction of import tariffs. Therefore a certain part of positive PSE is connected with this factor.  
This factor will be particularly significant in 1995 when import tariffs were raised again. 
 
Sunflower Seeds/Oil 
For sunflower seeds, it is reasonable to use the approach applied for sugar beets, in which the price 
for a processed product serves as a reference price.  In this case, one needs to use sunflower oil. Because 
Russia is a net importer of vegetable oil, the price of imported sunflower oil could be used as a proxy of 
the reference price for sunflower seeds.  However, these prices are too high because imported oil is of 
higher quality and has a higher level of preparation for retail trade.  For this reason, the annual average 
price of exported sunflower oil is used for the calculation of market support. These prices better reflect 
the average quality of domestically traded oil. 
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In this sector agricultural producers also prefer to have processors only extract and return oil and 
other byproducts (meal, etc.) to the producers of seeds.  After processing, the oil has been sold on the 
retail and wholesale markets.  In 1993 and 1994, PSE estimates for this crop have been around zero 
(Appendix, Table A.12).  This figure indicates that the benefits of entrepreneurship were the main factors 
that allowed agricultural producers to obtain revenues that are comparable to revenues from marketing at 
world prices.  It is expected that high import tariffs on vegetable oil will raise PSE estimations in 1995. 
 
Potatoes 
The previous work by Liefert et al. does not consider potato production.  However, this crop is an 
important source of income for small agricultural farms.  In a recent study, PSEs for potatoes are 
calculated (Appendix, Table A.13).  Again, prices for marketed production have been distinguished 
between LAEs and PSFs.  The average price of the potato export from the Czech Republic is used as a 
reference price.  Of course, the best choice would be to choose the Poland export price for potatoes 
because Russia sometimes imports significant quantities of potatoes from this country.  However, these 
prices were not available. Furthermore, many Polish potatoes were bartered.  Therefore, Czech prices are 
considered as a proxy for Polish prices. 
 Starting with negative numbers in 1992 and 1993, the PSE for potatoes became positive in 1994 
(64 percent).  However, this sector of agricultural production did not receive notable  government 
support; there are no direct subsidies and import tariffs do not play a significant role for pricing on retail 
markets (see Appendix A, Table A.13).  One source of the positive PSE is a compensation for 
entrepreneurship because PSFs sell their potatoes on retail markets.  Another source is the depreciation of 
the exchange rate which makes the national currency more valuable with respect to the U.S. dollar. 
 
 Summary and Conclusions 
We have critiqued the PSE method as it is traditionally applied and can conclude that it has severe 
limitations when it is applied to transition economies.  Many of the conditions taken for granted in mature 
market economies cannot be assumed for transition economies, so the validity of PSE measures are 
questionable.  Certainly these measures must be interpreted with more caveats than would normally apply 
in, say, OECD countries. 
Despite these deficiencies, we have attempted to calculate PSEs for Russia, being especially careful 
in selection of appropriate farm prices and reference prices.  We have also conducted a sensitivity 
analysis to indicate how the results could be influenced by changes in key assumptions.  These results are 
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compared to previous estimates of PSEs by Liefert et al. and resolve some of the questions raised by that 
analysis (see Tables 5 and 6). 
The results that are most similar to the Liefert paper (PSE-USDA) are those where the same 
domestic wholesale prices were used for all producers (PSE-1).  However, as a result of selecting farm 
prices more carefully and choosing reference prices that more accurately reflect opportunity costs of 
domestic product sales, these estimates are less alarming than the Liefert results.  Most are still negative, 
but not as large in absolute value.  PSEs for eggs become positive in 1993-94 and for poultry in 1994. 
 When PSEs are calculated with differentiated prices for two groups of agricultural producers (PSE-
2), the meat, milk, eggs, sugar beet, and sunflower seed results move further away from large negative 
figures of Liefert and a few more positive PSEs appear.  Grain results do not change, since large and 
small farms both sell to major processors and do not usually market grain directly.  The increased average 
prices reflected in these results are due to a large extent to returns to entrepreneurship, since the higher 
prices are obtained by the group of farms that engage in direct marketing.  These results are likely to 
overstate the prices these farmers receive, since the cost of post-harvest activities is not counted.  These 
costs, however, are smaller than the differences between prices associated with PSE-1 and PSE-2.  
The next set of calculations takes the differentiated price results and adjusts them for exchange 
disequilibrium.  Following the OECD method, we picked a year (1994) where the exchange rate was 
deemed to be at or near equilibrium, then calculated equilibrium exchange rates for the previous years. 
This calculation simply assumes that prior year exchange rates differ from 1994 as if purchasing power 
parity holds.  The exchange rate for 1994 remains the same, while for 1993 it is 709 rubles/dollar 
(nominal 962), and for 1992 it is 75 rubles/dollar (nominal 205).  The PSEs for 1994, of course, do not 
change, but earlier years are dramatically different.  Only a few negative PSEs remain, and all of these are 
for grains, because market conditions and infrastructure together with regional regulation hold consumer 
product prices down. 
The large impact of the exchange rate disequilibrium in earlier years should not be surprising.  The 
national currency, the ruble, was only in the early stages of adjustment from a highly distorted rate to a 
market rate.  This did not happen quickly, so in those years the exchange was undervalued and was not a 
valid measure of the value of foreign goods in the domestic market.  In fact, the U.S. dollar was 
frequently used as the medium of exchange during that period. 
Given the appropriate reference prices, differentiated farm prices, and adjustment for exchange rate 
distortions, the results in the PSE-3 scenario may be closer than the others in reflecting a realistic view of 
government support of agriculture in Russia.  These results indicate positive support for all agricultural 
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products except for grain.  In most years, grains and especially wheat have negative PSEs.  This is 
consistent with a government policy to import as needed to keep food grain products available at 
relatively low prices. However, even the PSE-3 scenario cannot be considered very reliable in comparing 
levels of support with OECD countries or even with other economies in various stages of transition.  
When comparison of domestic and border prices is used as the main indicator of support or losses, the 
results will always be less reliable where markets are immature and poorly integrated with external 
markets. 
  
 
Table 5.  Dynamic comparison of various estimations of PSEs for livestock products 
 
 
 
 
 
Beef 
 
 
 
 
 
Pork 
 
 
 
Poultry 
 
 
 
Milk 
 
 
 
 
 
Eggs 
 
 
 
 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
PSE-USDA 
 
-1162 
 
-449 
 
-363 
 
-680 
 
-175 
 
-136 
 
-432 
 
-58 
 
-31 
 
-918 
 
-467 
 
-310 
 
-635 
 
-209 
 
-79 
 
PSE-1 
 
-193 
 
-74 
 
-36 
 
-292 
 
-71 
 
-31 
 
-201 
 
-32 
 
5 
 
-137 
 
-61 
 
-34 
 
-211 
 
30 
 
48 
 
PSE-2 
 
-148 
 
-16 
 
14 
 
-33 
 
22 
 
41 
 
-31 
 
15 
 
29 
 
-4 
 
3 
 
45 
 
-211 
 
30 
 
48 
 
PSE-3 
 
9 
 
43 
 
14 
 
51 
 
43 
 
41 
 
39 
 
15 
 
29 
 
62 
 
28 
 
45 
 
14 
 
49 
 
48 
 
Table 6.  Dynamic comparison of various estimations of PSEs for crop products 
 
 
 
Wheat 
 
Corn 
 
Barley 
 
Sugarbeet 
 
Sunflower seed 
 
 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
PSE-USDA 
 
-399 
 
-292 
 
-341 
 
-120 
 
-103 
 
-24 
 
-277 
 
-187 
 
-304 
 
-482 
 
-184 
 
-108 
 
-164 
 
-322 
 
-173 
 
PSE-1 
 
-106 
 
-98 
 
-132 
 
-40 
 
-48 
 
-10 
 
-274 
 
-88 
 
-90 
 
-23 
 
-7 
 
-1 
 
-49 
 
-242 
 
-123 
 
PSE-2 
 
-106 
 
-98 
 
-132 
 
-40 
 
-48 
 
-10 
 
-274 
 
-88 
 
-90 
 
16 
 
25 
 
16 
 
-56 
 
0 
 
5 
 
PSE-3 
 
24 
 
-46 
 
-132 
 
49 
 
-9 
 
-10 
 
-38 
 
-38 
 
-90 
 
69 
 
45 
 
16 
 
43 
 
26 
 
5 
Notes: PSE-USDA - calculations presented by Liefert, et al. 
PSE-1 - calculations with the same prices for agricultural producers 
PSE-2 - calculations with differentiated prices for agricultural producers 
PSE-3 - calculations with adjusted exchange rate 
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Table A.1  Estimation of  PSEs for beef and veal 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total (live) 
 
thou. tons 
 
6081 
 
5435 
 
4750 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
4681 
 
3835 
 
3100 
 
3 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
1400 
 
1600 
 
1650 
 
4 
 
Production marketed, total (carcass) 
 
thou. tons 
 
3223 
 
2881 
 
2518 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
2481 
 
2033 
 
1643 
 
6 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
742 
 
848 
 
875 
 
7 
 
Weighted market price (carcass ): 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
62 
 
895 
 
2594 
 
8 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
46 
 
520 
 
1468 
 
9 
 
- private subsidiary farms** 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
119 
 
1795 
 
4710 
 
10 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion  rubles 
 
153 
 
675 
 
1203 
 
11 
 
Subsidies  per unit (carcass) (10/4) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
47 
 
234 
 
478 
 
12 
 
Supported domestic price  (7+11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
110 
 
1129 
 
3072 
 
13 
 
Reference price (carcass)*** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
1330 
 
1365 
 
1159 
 
14 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
15 
 
Converted reference price (13*14) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
273 
 
1313 
 
2638 
 
16 
 
Unit PSE (12-15) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-163 
 
-184 
 
434 
 
17 
 
Percentage PSE (16/12*100) 
 
% 
 
-148 
 
-16 
 
14 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - annual average city market price 
*** - average price of import 
 
Note: Production marketed by large agricultural enterprises in 1994 was defined on the basis of percentage structure 
of 1993 using the information on overall  livestock sales. Production marketed by private subsidiary farms was 
defined on the basis of the changes in the structure of livestock herds. 
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Table A.2  Estimation of  PSEs  for pigmeat 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total (live) 
 
thou. tons 
 
3576 
 
3138 
 
2990 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
1676 
 
1257 
 
1080 
 
3 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
1900 
 
1881 
 
1910 
 
4 
 
Production marketed, total (carcass) 
 
thou. tons 
 
2539 
 
2228 
 
2123 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
1190 
 
892 
 
767 
 
6 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
1349 
 
1336 
 
1356 
 
7 
 
Weighted market price (carcass ): 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
180 
 
1540 
 
4236 
 
8 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
44 
 
619 
 
1743 
 
9 
 
- private subsidiary farms** 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
300 
 
2155 
 
5646 
 
10 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
65 
 
333 
 
579 
 
11 
 
Subsidies  per unit (carcass) (10/4) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
26 
 
149 
 
273 
 
12 
 
Supported domestic price  (7+11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
206 
 
1689 
 
4509 
 
13 
 
Reference price (carcass)*** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
1330 
 
1365 
 
1159 
 
14 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
15 
 
Converted reference price (13*14) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
273 
 
1313 
 
2638 
 
16 
 
Unit PSE (12-15) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-67 
 
376 
 
1871 
 
17 
 
Percentage PSE (16/12*100) 
 
% 
 
-33 
 
22 
 
41 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - annual average city market price 
*** - average price of import 
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Table A.3  Estimation of  PSEs  for poultry 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total (live) 
 
thou. tons 
 
2067 
 
1844 
 
1620 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
1367 
 
1244 
 
1020 
 
3 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
700 
 
600 
 
600 
 
4 
 
Production marketed, total (carcass) 
 
thou. tons 
 
1881 
 
1678 
 
1474 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
1244 
 
1132 
 
928 
 
6 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
637 
 
546 
 
546 
 
7 
 
Weighted market price (carcass ): 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
91 
 
924 
 
2382 
 
8 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
34 
 
523 
 
1638 
 
9 
 
- private subsidiary farms** 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
200 
 
1755 
 
3646 
 
10 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
66 
 
328 
 
719 
 
11 
 
Subsidies  per unit (carcass) (10/4) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
35 
 
195 
 
488 
 
12 
 
Supported domestic price  (7+11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
126 
 
1120 
 
2869 
 
13 
 
Reference price (carcass)*** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
1022 
 
986 
 
889 
 
14 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
15 
 
Converted reference price (13*14) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
210 
 
949 
 
2023 
 
16 
 
Unit PSE (12-15) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-84 
 
171 
 
846 
 
17 
 
Percentage PSE (16/12*100) 
 
% 
 
-67 
 
15 
 
29 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - annual average city market price 
*** - average price of import 
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Table A.4  Estimation of PSEs for eggs 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total: 
 
thou. tons 
 
27871 
 
26199 
 
23600 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
mln. eggs 
 
27871 
 
26199 
 
23600 
 
3 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
mln. eggs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/1000 
 
2 
 
49 
 
152 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/1000 
 
2 
 
49 
 
152 
 
6 
 
- private subsidiary farms** 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Conversion coefficient (eggs to kg) 
 
 
 
0.056 
 
0.056 
 
0.056 
 
8 
 
Handling margin 
 
% 
 
25 
 
25 
 
25 
 
9 
 
Adjusted market price (4*7*1.25): 
 
thou. rubles/tons 
 
45 
 
1083 
 
3400 
 
10 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
54 
 
302 
 
874 
 
11 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
2 
 
12 
 
37 
 
12 
 
Supported domestic price  (9+11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
47 
 
1094 
 
3437 
 
13 
 
Reference price ** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
713 
 
793 
 
784 
 
14 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
15 
 
Converted reference price (13*14) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
146 
 
763 
 
1784 
 
16 
 
Unit PSE (9-15) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-99 
 
331 
 
1652 
 
17 
 
Percentage PSE (16/12*100) 
 
% 
 
-211 
 
30 
 
48 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - EU export  price  
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Table A.5  Estimation of  PSEs for milk 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total: 
 
thou. tons 
 
41644 
 
41371 
 
36000 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
26844 
 
25271 
 
19700 
 
3 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
14800 
 
16100 
 
16300 
 
4 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
19 
 
96 
 
458 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
6 
 
49 
 
152 
 
6 
 
- private subsidiary farms** 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
44 
 
170 
 
828 
 
7 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
210 
 
948 
 
2085 
 
8 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
5 
 
23 
 
58 
 
9 
 
Supported domestic price  (7+11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
24 
 
119 
 
516 
 
10 
 
Fat content - domestic 
 
% 
 
3.50 
 
3.50 
 
3.50 
 
11 
 
Fat content - New Zealand 
 
% 
 
4.73 
 
4.73 
 
4.73 
 
12 
 
Transport cost, milk equivalent 
 
USD/ton 
 
17 
 
18 
 
18 
 
13 
 
Reference price *** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
144 
 
138 
 
144 
 
14 
 
Adjusted reference price **** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
124 
 
120 
 
124 
 
15 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
16 
 
Converted reference price (14*15) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
25 
 
115 
 
283 
 
17 
 
Unit PSE (12-15) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-1 
 
3 
 
234 
 
18 
 
Percentage PSE  (17/9*100) 
 
% 
 
-4 
 
3 
 
45 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - annual average city market price 
*** - New Zealand farmgate price 
**** - price adjusted to domestic fat content and transportation cost 
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Table A.6  Estimation of  PSEs for wheat  
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total: 
 
thou. tons 
 
21746 
 
22773 
 
15435 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
21320 
 
22110 
 
14700 
 
3 
 
- peasant farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
426 
 
663 
 
735 
 
4 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
8 
 
48 
 
106 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
8 
 
48 
 
106 
 
6 
 
- peasant farms* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
8 
 
48 
 
106 
 
7 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
138 
 
526 
 
482 
 
8 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
6 
 
23 
 
31 
 
9 
 
Supported domestic price  (4+8) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
15 
 
71 
 
137 
 
10 
 
Reference price ** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
146 
 
147 
 
140 
 
11 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
12 
 
Converted reference price (10*11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
30 
 
141 
 
319 
 
13 
 
Unit PSE  (9-12) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-15 
 
-70 
 
-181 
 
14 
 
Percentage PSE  (13/9*100) 
 
% 
 
-106 
 
-98 
 
-132 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - average price of import 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of  the commodity  
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Table A.7  Estimation of  PSEs for  corn 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total: 
 
thou. tons 
 
1113 
 
559 
 
361 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
1091 
 
543 
 
344 
 
3 
 
- peasant farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
22 
 
16 
 
17 
 
4 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
9 
 
58 
 
251 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
9 
 
58 
 
251 
 
6 
 
- peasant farms 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
9 
 
58 
 
251 
 
7 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
14 
 
21 
 
18 
 
8 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
13 
 
38 
 
49 
 
9 
 
Supported domestic price  (4+8) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
21 
 
96 
 
299 
 
10 
 
Reference price ** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
146 
 
147 
 
145 
 
11 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
12 
 
Converted reference price (10*11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
30 
 
141 
 
330 
 
13 
 
Unit PSE (9-12) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-9 
 
-46 
 
-31 
 
14 
 
Percentage PSE  (13/9*100) 
 
% 
 
-40 
 
-48 
 
-10 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - average price of import 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of  the commodity  
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Table A.8  Estimation of  PSEs for  barley 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total: 
 
thou. tons 
 
6863 
 
6748 
 
6517 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
6729 
 
6551 
 
6207 
 
3 
 
- peasant farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
135 
 
197 
 
310 
 
4 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
6 
 
38 
 
77 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
6 
 
38 
 
77 
 
6 
 
- peasant farms 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
6 
 
38 
 
77 
 
7 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
6 
 
143 
 
119 
 
8 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
1 
 
21 
 
18 
 
9 
 
Supported domestic price  (4+8) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
7 
 
59 
 
95 
 
10 
 
Reference price ** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
127 
 
115 
 
79 
 
11 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
12 
 
Converted reference price (10*11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
26 
 
111 
 
180 
 
13 
 
Unit PSE  (9-12) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-19 
 
-52 
 
-85 
 
14 
 
Percentage PSE  (13/9*100) 
 
% 
 
-274 
 
-88 
 
-90 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - average price of import 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of  the commodity  
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Table A.9  Estimation of  PSEs  for  sugarbeet/sugar 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total: 
 
thou. tons 
 
11209 
 
7422 
 
1358 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
10989 
 
7143 
 
1312 
 
3 
 
- peasant farms  
 
thou. tons 
 
220 
 
279 
 
46 
 
4 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
2 
 
20 
 
59 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises * 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
2 
 
20 
 
59 
 
6 
 
- peasant farms 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
3 
 
24 
 
56 
 
7 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
29 
 
80 
 
33 
 
8 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
3 
 
11 
 
24 
 
9 
 
Supported domestic price  (4+8) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
5 
 
31 
 
83 
 
10 
 
Coefficient (beet to sugar) 
 
% 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
11 
 
Retail price for sugar 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
88 
 
494 
 
910 
 
12 
 
Reference price  ** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
272 
 
293 
 
290 
 
13 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
14 
 
Converted reference price (13*14) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
56 
 
282 
 
660 
 
15 
 
CRP in terms of beet (14*10/100) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
6 
 
33 
 
83 
 
16 
 
Unit PSE  (9-15) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-1 
 
-2 
 
-1 
 
17 
 
Percentage PSE  (16/9*100) 
 
% 
 
-23 
 
-7 
 
-1 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - annual average price of imported raw sugar 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of  the commodity  
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Table A.10  Estimation of  PSEs for  sugarbeet/sugar (alternative approach) 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production (beet) 
 
thou. tons 
 
25548 
 
25468 
 
13901 
 
2 
 
Production marketed (beet) 
 
thou. tons 
 
11209 
 
7422 
 
1358 
 
3 
 
Production exchanged for sugar (beet) 
 
thou. tons 
 
14339 
 
18046 
 
12543 
 
4 
 
Coefficient (beet to sugar) 
 
% 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
5 
 
Sugar received  from  exchange 
 
thou. tons 
 
1506 
 
2117 
 
1587 
 
6 
 
Market price (beet) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
2 
 
20 
 
59 
 
7 
 
Market price (sugar, wholesale) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
58 
 
329 
 
607 
 
8 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
4 
 
33 
 
75 
 
9 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
29 
 
80 
 
33 
 
10 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
3 
 
11 
 
24 
 
11 
 
Supported domestic price   (8+11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
7 
 
44 
 
99 
 
12 
 
Retail price for sugar 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
88 
 
494 
 
910 
 
13 
 
Reference price  ** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
272 
 
293 
 
290 
 
14 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
15 
 
Converted reference price (13*14) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
56 
 
282 
 
660 
 
16 
 
CRP in terms of beet (15*4/100)/ 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
6 
 
33 
 
83 
 
17 
 
Unit PSE (beet) (11-16) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
1 
 
11 
 
16 
 
18 
 
Percentage PSE  (17/11*100) 
 
% 
 
16 
 
25 
 
16 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - annual average price of imported raw sugar 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity  
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Table A.11  Estimation of  PSEs for  sunflower seeds 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total: 
 
thou. tons 
 
1609 
 
1538 
 
1507 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
1521 
 
1399 
 
1368 
 
3 
 
- peasant farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
88 
 
139 
 
140 
 
4 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
17 
 
72 
 
310 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
17 
 
72 
 
310 
 
6 
 
- peasant farms** 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
17 
 
72 
 
310 
 
7 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
37 
 
31 
 
17 
 
8 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
23 
 
20 
 
11 
 
9 
 
Supported domestic price  (4+8) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
39 
 
92 
 
321 
 
10 
 
Reference price ** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
287 
 
328 
 
315 
 
11 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
12 
 
Converted reference price (10*11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
59 
 
316 
 
717 
 
13 
 
Unit PSE (9-12) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-19 
 
-223 
 
-396 
 
14 
 
Percentage PSE  (13/9*100) 
 
% 
 
-49 
 
-242 
 
-123 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - c.i.f. price to Baltic ports  
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity  
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Table A.12  Estimation of  PSEs for  sunflower seed/oil (alternative approach) 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production (seed) 
 
thou. tons 
 
3110 
 
2765 
 
2553 
 
2 
 
Production marketed (seed) 
 
thou. tons 
 
1609 
 
1538 
 
1507 
 
3 
 
Production exchanged for oil (seed) 
 
thou. tons 
 
758 
 
1211 
 
710 
 
4 
 
Coefficient (seed to oil) 
 
% 
 
42 
 
41 
 
41 
 
5 
 
Oil  received  from product  exchange 
 
thou. tons 
 
318 
 
496 
 
291 
 
6 
 
Market price (seed) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
17 
 
72 
 
310 
 
7 
 
Market price (oil, wholesale) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
58 
 
584 
 
2028 
 
8 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
19 
 
146 
 
477 
 
9 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
29 
 
80 
 
33 
 
10 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
18 
 
52 
 
22 
 
11 
 
Supported domestic price   (8+10) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
37 
 
198 
 
499 
 
12 
 
Retail price for oil 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
70 
 
707 
 
2454 
 
13 
 
Reference price  ** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
667 
 
500 
 
510 
 
14 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
15 
 
Converted reference price (13*14) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
137 
 
481 
 
1161 
 
16 
 
CRP in terms of seed (15*4/100) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
57 
 
197 
 
476 
 
17 
 
Unit PSE (seed) (11-16) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-21 
 
0 
 
23 
 
18 
 
Percentage PSE  (17/11*100) 
 
% 
 
-56 
 
0 
 
5 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - annual average price of exported sunflower oil 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity  
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Table A.13  Estimations of  PSEs for potatoes 
 
 
 
 
 
Units 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1 
 
Production marketed, total: 
 
thou. tons 
 
2964 
 
3402 
 
2748 
 
2 
 
- large agricultural enterprises 
 
thou. tons 
 
2732 
 
2131 
 
1350 
 
3 
 
- private subsidiary farms 
 
thou. tons 
 
232 
 
1271 
 
1398 
 
4 
 
Weighted market price: 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
9 
 
72 
 
462 
 
5 
 
- large agricultural enterprises* 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
8 
 
55 
 
270 
 
6 
 
- private subsidiary farms** 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
26 
 
100 
 
647 
 
7 
 
All subsidies 
 
 billion rubles 
 
1 
 
3 
 
4 
 
8 
 
Subsidies  per unit  (7/1) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
9 
 
Supported domestic price  (4+8) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
10 
 
73 
 
463 
 
10 
 
Reference price *** 
 
 USD/ton 
 
97 
 
127 
 
74 
 
11 
 
Exchange rate 
 
rubles/USD 
 
205 
 
962 
 
2276 
 
12 
 
Converted reference price (10*11) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
20 
 
122 
 
168 
 
13 
 
Unit PSE (9-12) 
 
thou. rubles/ton 
 
-10 
 
-50 
 
295 
 
14 
 
Percentage PSE  (13/9*100) 
 
% 
 
-103 
 
-68 
 
64 
*- annual average  procurement price 
** - annual average city market price 
*** - average price of export from Czech Republic 
Note: sales for PSF  are based upon the data from budget surveys  
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